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Introduction
Alan ,.Tanes ("History of Peacekeeping: An Analytic Perspective")provided a classification of the variety of tlpes of peacekeeping in terms of the
form and function of such efforts. Was the conflict ideological or one of ethnic
conflict, or had there been a massive violation of human rights? Was thepeacekeeping operation one of enforcement or one of a good will ambassador and
counsellor coming between warring parties? Was it a border operation or one whichfell within the jurisdiction of a sovereigrn state? What was the purpose of the
peacekeepers if they did operate within the territorial jurisdiction of a state?
rhe conrinu*y 
"trt#13*3#ffrt#Ji$f;" "1ffi""t^ir'1tt',"r#i,t{"":" (:}::"*::;ffi8Since 1985") offered a conceptual analysis and a somewhat different
classification that stressed the discontinuity between the increased nurnber of
peacekeeping operations of the last few years and those that predated them
because his focus was not on the form and function of the peacekeeping operationsprimarilyr but on the local authority qranting permission for the peacekeepinginitiatj.ve. The Agenda fot Peaee does not mention the term, "intervention" once,but the new tlpe of peacekeeping operation in northern Iraq, in Soma1ia, in
Bosnia-Hercegovina, and even in Cambodia have been interventionist operations
without the consent of any or aII the parties to the conflict. Further, partiesto the conflict have been political or ethnic groups which had no constituted
authority of any kind.
Phillippe Kirsch ("Legal Issues") complemented Tom Weiss'sdistinctions by filling in the legal aspects to differentiate classical
peacekeeping from the expanded operations that have emerged since 1988 and a newthird tlpe which operates in an unprecedented environment where the peacekeepers
are no longer present as a result of the formal consent of the conflictingparties and are present within the borders of a state with both a more proactive
role and greater risk to the peacekeepers. Hence, the rules of engagement differ.F\rther, the peacekeepers may be there as much to protect civilians as to keep
the waring parties apart. Thus, the peacekeepers may have different functions,
such as providing security for humanitarian assistance and safe havens. Theprohibition against interference in the domestic affairs of a state has been set
aside somewhat in the nelr peacekeeping mode.
Complenenting these theoretical and historical papers have been
a series of much more grounded presentations - case studies of Clprus and the
Western Sahara, a detailed analysis of the high cost and multiplication of these
new operations and the inadeguate lesources to pay for then while the UN itself
gras expanding its responsibilities in the protection of the environment, human
rights and the provision of hurnanitarian relief which have added to the pressures
on-the infrastructure and personnel of the UN, and the innovative steps that are
underway to develop the intelligence, planning, chain of conmand, decision making
and communication capacity of the UN to respond to these new challenges.
fn the alternatinq provision of an intellectual franework for
Iooking at the issues and much more grounded analysis in terms of actual
operations, this paper will weigh in on the side of a theoretical analysis.
llowever, instead of providing an analysis and classification of peacekeeping
operations in terms of form, function, politicaL theory and legal practice, this
paper wilL attempt to provide an answer to the two guestions-raised by Arnbassador
-touis Frechette. In what situations should the international community intervene
when there are a multitude of ethnic conflicts and civil wars on this earth, when
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intervention no longer follows the classical policy of reguiring the agreement
of the partie.s to the conflict and. where ethnic grggpq or ideological enemies maybe at each others throats rather than between two different states? Secondly, hoil
should the international corrnunity intervene? Or as Colone} John Bremner put both
'guestions so pithily, "!{here .are hte going?" This paper offers to piovide agrundlegung, a grounding for the new modes of peacekeeping in refugee tneory.
A Philosophical Prefqce:The Kantian Vision
Individuals and groups who carry the onerous burden ofpeacekeeping and peac_emaking deal wilh the gritty reality of risking lives andprotecting Iives. Philosophers deal with such esoteric subjects at wtr-at it meansto live the good 1ife. It is difficult to be concerned about the good life whenyour job is simply to protect the living.
Inuaanuel Kant, the great German philosopher who wrote at the end
of the elghteenth century, began his essay on Perpetual Peace with these remarks:
'lJhg pragtical- politician. (and I_night add, the practical military officer ordiplomat) assumes the attitude of looking down with great self-satlsfaction onthe political theorist as. pedant whose empty ideas in no. way threaten the
security of the stater- inasmuch as the state must proceed on errpiricalprinciples; so the theorist is al]owed to play his game wibhout interference fromthe sorldly-wise statesman." If you think war is dangerous, look at the danger
of showing disdain and contempt or even condescension for the realm of theory indplaying with apparently empty ideas. Even if the ancient Athenians took the wrong
course in executi{tg Socrates just f9r being a philosopher, they correctlydiscerned that philosophers are very dangerous andinsidious. Look-at ImmanueiKant hjmself. He introduced the idea of envisioning a peaceful world policed by
a League of Nations - surely the emptiest and most hair-brained idea-the world
had heard to that date when the governing principle of the world of international
affairs was that each state r.ras me-rely responsible for its own security. Beware
of empty ideas. ?hey have the habit of fil]ing up with action.
Philosophers are doubly insidious. We do not ask you to aceept
our ideas because they are correct. lle simply point out, as KanE did in thit
seminal papelr that we are simply asking worldly-wise statesmen, diplomats and
military-officers to act conriatontty in the case of conflict. Bewaie not only
of the Ides of March and the ideas of philosophers, but of reguests that you be
consistent in your actions.
With that warning label - namely, that philosophers as well as
cigarettes are dangerous to your health - let us recall the content of theKantian vision and the idea that I believe has been singularly responsible in the
realm of theory for the role Canadians and others have been increasingly askedto play as peacekeepers for the United Nations.
Kant wrote that, "there must be a leagrue of peace (foeduspacificum)." Though this central- idea of Kant's is often recalled, the two
criteria he set for its implementation nay have been forgotten. Kant went on todistinguish a leagrue of peace ,from a treaty of peace (pactum pacis) by the factthat the latter terminates only one war, while the former seeks to make an end
of all wars forever.fr The long term goal was not just an armistice or even sinply
a peace treaty betweeri the warring parties, but each peacekeeping operation
should be assessed in terms of whether or not it contributes or detracts from thelong term goal of tenninating htar altogether. Kant went onto say that, "Thisleague does not tend to any dominion over the power of the state itself and of
other states in leaque with it." (356) The immediate goal was rrot dominion over
the state but merely the maintenance of freedom and security. The inhabitants of
the state itseLf had to remain responsible for reconstructing their civil society
and reestablishing the government. tr remind you of these two criteria which were
set out in the first vision of an international peacekeeping force.
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Ambassador Louise Frechette raised the guestlon about guidelines
about where to i.ntervene and how to intervene given the multitude of conflicts
around the world. Kant provided two guidelines. In the answer to where, you haveto ask the guestion whether the intervention will advance the day when we canlive on this earth without war. That is the security criterion. Secondly, with
respect to the issue of how, the answer is to establish Law and order not to beking of the castle, but to establish law and order so that humans in that area
are free to establish their own governments and develop their own civil
societies. The choice of where to provide peacekeepers must be guided by whether
the operation contributes to the long term goal of terminating $rar altogether.
The choice of how to introduce a peacekeeping operation must be guided by theprinciple that the league of peace must not seek dominion over a society but only
the security so that the people of that socJ-ety are free to choose their own
government and construct their own civil society.
The Kantian vision gras a product of the historical imagi-nation,
a created world, a,self-contained entity which serves as an end-in-itself. Kant
was not concerned with a possible world in the sense of alternative events and
actions that could have hippened instead of what actually did happen.3e Kant was
concerned with a possible future world. t{hat I now want to show, however
sketchily, 5.s how, -in the twentieth century, we have witnessed the application
and development of this possible idea through four different actual phases in the
development of international refugee policy. These are not arbitrary phases, but
stages in which 'each and every element has a specific role in the interrelated
whoie. "'o
An Historical Perspective on Refuqees-Four Phases of Development
The development of j-nternational policy with respect to refugeesin the twentieth century can be divided inlo four phases, roughly separated bythe four guartiles of this century. These four phases in which the newinternational refugee order has developed over the twentieth century to deal withthe flow of refugees and provide humanitarian assistance may be sunsnarized asfollows:
The Developnent of an InteEnatioBal Response to Refuqee Flows
Phase I
Phase II
Interim
Phase fII
Spontaneous Self-Selection and Resettlement
Separation
Forced Repatriation
Protection of Minorities
Repatriation (of DPs) versus Resettlement (of
refugees)
Protection for individuals who were outside the borders of their
home state and who had a well-founded fear of persecution
Humanitarian and settlement assistance for those in refugee-Iike
situations
39 cf. ceoffrey Hasthorn, plausible norlds: Possjbi.lity and understanding in tistory and t}le
social scjences, catnbridge: canbrldqe Unlverslty Pless, 1991.
{0,tos6 C. Berllejo-Barrera, "Explicatlng the Past,' History andTheory 32: Nov., l-993, p.2L.
Bermeyo-Barrera has written a nunber of books i-n- 
- 
Spanish on th9 philosophy of histoly 
_-psicia{nalisis dej conocjajento hist6rico (l.tadrld, L9821, El Final de la lristoria Te6rica (lladlld,
198?), Repl.anteamiento de Ia tlistoria.. Eassayos de Historia Te6tica II (titadrid, 1989), and
nrndamentrci6n l6gica de la llistoria (Madrid, 1991).
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rater became *"tfr':: t-'""""t F:f"i: tli*$s""::lIf:h?1rtT.:5'xi*T',:r";:3:
could flee to start a new life. The whole earth had not yet been carved up intopolitical entities divided by borders with controls to tirnit entrv and
resettlement. Individuals who suffered under one political jurisdiction-cou1dflee to and resettle in another jurisdiction. Individuals and families fled to
a jurisdiction where they would not be persecuted. It was a period of spontaneous
self selection and self-settlement where the opportunities were open and the
responsibility for seeking and finding a safe hiven rested with the refugees
themselves.
concnun*i"". o"#irffil?J,li.:f"?#'#"tr#1",#"TX:'?J"t:"??""[?:'.",i"$Jff.l3:in 1923. (Marrus, pp. 96-109) l{here separation and partitioh were not-seen aspracticable, as was the case in the flight of the Armenians from the mass murder
and persecution by the Turks, the League of Nations acted to assist in their
resettlement. (Marrus, pp. 14-8\; ll9-]-2]-)
Resettlement was the core approach to refugees who fled as a
result of ideologlqql conflict, such as the 8001000 Russians throughout Europein 1921 or the 10,000 Italian anti-fascists who resettled in France ih tne 1930-s.
However, when the problem was ethnic persecution on a massive scale and it was
no longer perceJ-ved t9 be practicable for countries mired in the great, depressionto accept_ fgfggges., b-o^rders were closed. The High Cormnission for Refugees hadbeen established in 1933 to deal with these refugees, but .Iames G. McDona1d
resigrned in 1935 in protest at the very few resettlement places available to deal
with the_refugees and the unwillingness of the international conmunity to tacklethe problem at its source. (Marrus, pp. 161-166) Even the Evian Conference inL938' specifically called to deal with the Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany ina carefully orchestrated.public relations exercise, affirmed the rights ofgovernmenls tg 
_lfunit the intake of refugees .on the basis of whether th-ey were1ike1y.to be able to reestablish-thensel.ves given the absorptive capacity bf the
receiving state. (Marrus, pp. 166-20'l)
Even after the end of WorLd tlar IT, the policy of forced
repatriation continued. The Potsdan Agreement0 made provision and the allies
implemented the forced repatriation of the Oeustdeutsch who had lived in Poland,Czechoslovakia and Hungary for generations - when the exodus from Russia and theBaltic states are incl.uded it is estimated that 11 million Germans were
repatriated to the devastated economy of a Germany with a population of onlv40;000,000 people at the time. The Yalta Agreement 6f Februaryr- 1945,12 providedfor the repatriation of Soviet citizens without obtaining their consent, aprovision which was largely but not entj.rely implemented.
However, it must be recalled that if people were forcefully
repatriated, they were not ca.Iled refugees. For if you were scheduled for
repatriation, you were not a refugeer but were formally referred to as Displaced
Persons. The debate over nomenclature focused on the International Refuqee
Phase IV Stemming flows of Refugees
'1 Cf. A. de ZayaE, lJenesis at Potsdan: the englo-Aaericrns and the E4rulsion of the cel.nans,19??. See also Uarlus, pp. 326-331.
{2 N. Tol"aoy, victi.ns of ya).ta, 19?? and t{ark R. E}Iiott, Parrns of Yatta: soyiet Refugees
and America's Rofe jn ?ieir Repatriation, Chicago, 1982.
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Organizatiqn (IRg).{3 UNRRA, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency
set up at the end of 1943, was not authorized to deal with or find solutioni foi
refugees who "who cannot return to their homes."aaf Soviet citizens without
obtaining their consent, a provision which was largely but not entirely
implemented.
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However, it must be recalled that if people were forcefullythey were not caL7ed refugees. For if you were scheduled foryou were not a refugee, but were formalll L lly referred to as Displaced
over nomenclature focused on the International Refuqeeg
IJN_RRA, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency1-943, was not authorized to deal with or find solutions foi
"who cannot return to their homes.n46 UNRRA dealt with Dps.
rhe asreemenrs # r:X?"H"tfr"?:b'"i?!'"?? r::it:: :'.i$ffi:tt3lH""fi:a5"uEii3Bfi
refugees -- pre-or post- war victims of Nazi or fascist regimes or of racial,
relioious or oolitical persecution and disolaced oersons lDPsl whn werrigi us p litical cution p p  ( ) o redisplaced in the course of or after World gfar II. With respect to DPs, the IROl -. it les F
was "to encourage and ?-ssist in every possible manner the e-rly return to theircountries of origin".a? If 
'Jews wbrre classified as DPs, the IRO would beer<pected.to arranqg fgq their repatriation. rrA DP nay be defined as a persondisplace4 by war but wishinq 
_qo return home once the fighting is over. A reiugee,
on the other hand' may be defined as a person who has fled home and who does-not
wish to return, at least not to the circumstances which occasioned flight."ne
The end of the second phase of international refugee policy canbe characterized by induced resettlement for a polulation whictr corila n6t Ue
repatriated by either force or international law and notlnn. The Lreatment of the
,Jews and the Palestinian Arabs characterized this shift.
'3 cf._Roggr zetter, ilabel-ling Refugees: Forning and Transfollring a Bureaucratic Identlty,i(Jounal, of Refuqee Studies, 4:1, Novenber, 1991) where Roger useg the case of Cyprus to indj.c;tethe lmportant conaequences of labe1llng, Fo! the history of tlNRB.Ar see Louli-e Holborne, Thefnte-rnational" Refugee-_Organization: A specialized Agency of the Ohited lttations - Its History and work7946-7952, London, 1956.
{{ UN do". A/C.3/SR.1-11. Cf. George lfoodbridge, OII'RRA, the History of the United.titatjonsRelief and ReiaDilitation ^lrtninjstration, 3 vo1s. (Ne$ York: Columbia Unlversity Presa, 1950) Uarrus
oeustdeutsch rrho had llved in Poland, Czechoglovakla and llungary for generatlons - when the exodusflom Russla and the Baltic states are included lt ls estinated that 11 nillion Germans serelepatriated to the devastated economy of a Gernany wlth a populatlon of on]y {0,000,000 people atthe tlne. The Yalta Agreenent of February, 19{5, provlded for the repatriatl
{5 cf. Roge! Zetter, iLabelllngRefugees: Fornlng and transforminq a Bureaucratic Identlty,"(.7ournal of Refugee studies, ,l:L, l{ovenber, 1991} strere Roger uses the case of cyprus to indicatethe lmpoltant consequenceg of labeIling. For the hlstory of ITNRRA, see Loulse Holborne, ?DeInternational Refugee Otganizationt A specialized Ageney of the ttnited Nations - fts ltistory and Jtork
7946-7952, London, 1955.
45 (tN do". A/C.3/SR.1-11. Cf. George Hoodbridqe, UltRRe,' the History of the United l\tationa
Reliefand Rehabilitation Achinistratjon, 3 vols. (Nen York: Colunbia UniverElty Press, 1950) ttarrus
estimated ITNRRA i{as responsible for returnlng almost 2 nlllion refugees Hhlch stllI left 650,000
without homes. (p. 320) See alEo Kln Salonon, "The Cold war Helitage: IJNRRA and the IRO asPredeceasols of the ITNHCR, i ln Gbran Rystad, ed. ?De Wrooted: Eorced tqiqration as an fnternationa.lProblem in the Post-ytar Era, Lund Univelslty Press, 1990. For a guide to ITNRRA archival aources see
uarilla B. Guptil, iRecords of the Unlted Nations Rellef and Rehabllltatj.on Adninistratlon, 1943-t9,l8r' Journal of ref[qee studies, 5:1, l{o. L, 1992.
ttArrrr"* 1, para. 1(b), Draft constltution of the IRo, A/12?.
'18 solomon 1990, p. L59.
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Prope0 or
.3,?,T': j:r. I e{ugee stud ies
obvious prace r# .flEH"r,l'1T ,:t":1"t":l:oni;"f1tn:n"r?k"t3?.f:tn;i:iR :1X il:limitation of other options. As the Report of the High Commissioner for Refugees
submitted to the Twenty-First Ordinary Session of the League of Nations Assembly
had nobed, "Palestine alone has made a contribution of any size' in reference tolarqe-scale or qroup settLement of ,fews. {e
The Arab countries, led by Eqlpt and supported by Britain, first
attempted to set repatriatj.on as the goal of the IRO for aJ.l, persons, whether
refugbes or DPs. Mr. Kamel, the delegate of Egyptto, proposeFamending paragraph
2 of the PreambLe of the Draft Constitution of IRO to reguire serious r-easons tojustify resettlern_ent. Though defeated, the British delegate led the oppositionto the prov!-sion5r (which passed) defining German and Austrian residents of
Jewish origin as "refugeesn. Britain based its case on the ostensibly hiqh moralprinciple that this was merely a backhanded attempt to clear Europe of its Jews,in other words to accomp_lish Hitler's goal of making the German-speaking parts
of Europe ",Judenrein'.Y The main Arab effort then shifted to prevent
resettlement of ,Iews in Palestine by placing specific conditions on resettlement,
such as preventing resettlement where the Jews "will create politicaidifficulties in the countries of resettlement or in neighbouring counlri.es" or
where resettlement is undertaken "without the consent of the peoptes of the
countries of reception and without full consultation with the Stites members ofthe United Nations most directly concerned".53 These efforts were also defeated
as were a number of other subseguent efforts.
The Arabs, backed by the British, were defeated in the attemptto make repatriation the exclusive function of the IRO or to include ,Jews -in
those slated for repatriation. Even tdren repatriation was argued on the highest
morals grounds of eguality, non-discrimination and the opposition to a Europefree of ,Jews, the Arabs and British were unable to succeed in targeting the .Iewsfor what would have been forced repatriation. When the major eff5rts focused on
resettlement, the Arabs and British were unable to hedge the resettlement plans
with conditions which would exclude Palestine as a target area for resettlement
of the remnant of European tfews. Instead a policy of resettlement which, in the
case of the Jews, was forced upon the najority of the inhabitants of the area in
which they were to be resettled. In the case of the Palestinian Arabs, a policv
of resettlement was adopLed without the consent of the Palestinians -to ba
resettled. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees inthe Near East (UNRWA) was set up ostensiJrly to provide interim a|a and
enployment, butr in reality, to resettle the Palestinian refugees in the Arab
states under the guise of econonic integration.
If the first phase of the international policy of dealing with
refugees had been characterized by open borders, the second phase was
characterized by drawing new borders and dividing ethnic populations on different
sides of the border while guaranteeing the protection of minorities left on the
wrong side. The partition of Palestine was the last effort in that phase of
solvinq a refugee policy. As the last phase, a new state for the ,.Iews was
{9Records of the Teenty-Flrst Ordlnary Session of the Leagrue of Natlons, p.232.
to21"t neetlng of the Third Comnittee of the United Nations General Assenbly of the Unlted
l,lations on Novenber L2, t946.
51of Annex 1, Part 1, sectlon ll, pata. 3.
sze,/c.z/6ti A/c.3?58, p. 5, 9.
53g/86, p.6.
90
created, fsrael, and an al-most fifty year legacy of Palestinian refugees without
a state to guarantee their protection remained.
In contrast to the first phase of international refugee policy,
the period was characterized by redrawn rather than borders, by forcedn l o q n racE,erl q D o En Enan open D o Dl
repatriation and resettlement rather than the voluntary free movement ofaE l El q tEfe r En n rn c r nE r peopfe,
and by a system in which the international community accepted the responsibilityIfor protecting minorities within the jurisdiction of a state and for provision
of their essential needs when they were outside the jurisdiction of a state in
which the refugees were menbers. It was a period characterized by a plethora ofinternational refugee organizations, each set up to deal with a specific refugeeproblem 
- much as we now have a plethora of acronyms for peacekeeping operations
each set up to deal with a specific conffict area - rather than developing ageneric institutional approach to deal with all refugees. UNRWA was the Iast of
these institutional creations.
The Mandate of the UNHCR
The Convention of the United Nations High Conmission for Refugees
of 1951 moved away from regarding refugees en rnasse to focus on then- aspersecuted individuals, moved away from assistance to legal protection, and
focused only upon those who were already outside the borders of their country of
origin in spite of the pleas by Greece, India and Pakistan that the rnanciateinclude those displaced by civiL war, the latter arguing that those suffering
from disease and starvation were much worse off than those suffering persecution.
Eleanor Roosevelt led the debate and successful resolution that a genuine refugee
was one l.iho was outside hj.s/her country of ori.gin and had fled because of a well
founded fear of persecution on a number of grounds. Such refugees woul-d beguaranteed that (s)he would not be repatriated to the country where theindividual had been persecuted. To be a refugee wa's a gruarantee that anindividual outside his or her own country and so labelled would not be returnedto that country. It was a refugee regime built on two principles - the human
rights of the individual and the sacrosanct character of the borders of thepolitical state. Because the original solution to the refugee problem focused on
resettlement, the other solution offered was voluntary repatriation; the
compulsory exchange of populations of the post i{!{f period had been rejected.
Instead of open or shifting borders, borders were reified. You
were only a refugee if you were outside the jurisdiction of the state that had
the hisLorical responsibility of providing for an j.ndividual's protection. Forced
solutions were given up in favour of ostensible voluntarism. But it $ras no longer
the voluntarism of the first part of the century wtren there were a large number
of states in whj.ch refugees could resettle. It was d voluntarism which depended
on the willingness of states to also volunteer both to support the UNHCRfinancially and to provide opportunities for the persecuted individuals to
resettle. Instead of a system of the individual seeking the protection of a state
or the international comnunity ostensibly guaranteeing the protection of
minorities, the international conununity through the UNHCR guaranteed theprotection of individuals who had been persecuted and who had not yet been
accepted by a state which would assume responsibility for their protection.
Most refugees did not reguire that individual protecLion. They
were accepted en masse because they fled states regarded as enemy states with
antithetical values and nonns. Those fleeing communism and the confines of the
Iron Curtain were resettled in the glest. States, in particular the United States,
Australia and Canada, perceived refugees in ideological political terms. If youfled a communist regime, you were a refugee. In 1956 and 1968 refugees who hadfled from Hungary and Czechoslovakia were accepted en masse by these countries
of immigration and refugee resettlement. The refugees did not have to be
coranunists. At the end of that peri-od, Canada took in over 3.001000 American draft
dodgers and deserters from the Vietnam War because Canada wanted to differentiateitself from the behemoth to its south engaged in a war with which Canadians
v1
largely disagrreed, though Canada never had the courage to designate that intake
as a refugee flow.
The last ptr_ase of the development of international refugee policy
and practice began in 1973. Idi Amin began the practice of ethnic cleansing.Chile began the practice of ideological cleansing. The Ugandan Asians were
expellbd and Western staLes resettled its first group of refugees en masse who
were neither fleeing communism nor European. The socialists and communists who
opposed Pinochet were allowed to leave from their sanctuaries in various
embassj.es and were also resettled. Thq beginning of a non-racist, non-ideological
refugee regime had begun. Of the 351000 Ugandan Asians and 351000 Chilean
refugees' Canada took in and resettled about 202 of, each of those groups,
When the Communist government after its capture of the south
began practices which led to a more srrbtle form of ethnic cleansing of the
Vietnamese Chinese and ideological cleansing of dissenters in the former SouthVietnam, a massive resettlement of what would nrrmber over a million refugees was
begun in the late seventies and early eighties. This was on top of the massiveflows of refugees into neighbouring states as refugees fron Cambodia, from aplethora of states in Africa, fron Afghanistan into Pakistan and Iran, from Cubainto Florida, settled temporarily or permanently in their first countries of
asylun.
exponentiarly. BH:ttn"".i:h,fit::'"ffiuntTrrnH'bi#" ;ffffi,lt *"3i3P 
"tgi:3provided increased protection that refugee claimants who arrived spontaneously
would be given the protection of due lega} process under domestic legai
reguirements. By the late eighties, western states were inundated witn
spontaneous influxes of individuals claiming refugee status in a systern which was
only conceived and designed to handle asylun claimants in the hundreds. Laws and
regulations were passed throughout the western states who were signatories to theConvention to both provide legal processes for dealing with those claimants whilethe search began for means to stem the tide. States were both legally obligatedto accept these refugees if they satisfied the criteria. At the same Eirne,
refugee claimants wtto did not satisfy the reguirements were either IegaIIydeported or prevented by legal means (visas, fines on aj.rlines, interdiction
outsj.de the borders of one's state, etc.) from arriving in t,he first place.
For example, the OECD conference in March of 1993 in Madrid onMj.gration and Developnent attempted to examine whether developrnent aid woufd
assist in stemming the tide of migrants - econornic and political. Development
assistance as a method of steruting the flows of hordes of unwanted migiants
seemed to be put on the back burner once it was recognized that in the shoit and
medium terms the flow of migrants would actually increase as a result of such
efforts.
The four phases of development of refugee policy witnessed a
shift from relatively open borders, to a policy of altering borders in the areas
of conflict, to a system of sacrosanct and fixed borders where those who crossedborders had either to await repatriation, integrate in the first country of
asylum or be resettled. When the latter demand seemed to overwhelm the supply of
spaces the 9fest seemed willing to provide, sacrosanct borders became increasingly
closed borders as the borders of other states were redrawn, de faeto if not dejure. The four phases were characterized by: voluntary resettlenent; forced
repatriation and resettlementi voluntary repatriation, settlement and
resettlement; and IegaIIy obligatory resettlement, repatriation and settlenent
within the country of origin though perhaps in a different area than one's hone.
The responsibility for protection shifted frorn the individual to an international
theoretical system for minority protecLion, an actual system for individual legalprotection, and protection of minority groups either through total resett,lement
or repatriation in a protected haven where they could act as a self-determining
and qoverning majority.
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I now want to examine the contradictions of internationaL policy
wj-th respect to refuqee flows in four distinct areas of internationalhumanitarian military intervention - Iraq, Cambodia, Somalia and Yugoslavia..
Refuqees and Pe?cekeepinq
Since the end of the CoId War, the international communitv has
experimented with safe havens in Iraq and the former Yugoslavia, and the delivery
of humanitarian aid protected by international troops insid€ countries of
conflict without the permission of any formal state authority as in Somalia.International troops and observers are present i.n Carnbodia to oversee the
reestablishment of both a civil society and a state regime to keep the peace.While the international community dithers over Bosnia-Hercegovina, as we watch
day after day on our television screens the slaughter of helpless civiLians andhear tales of their brutal treatment, particularly of women, the West debates
extending humanitarian military intervention to the killing grounds of Bosnia.In an effort at preventive peacekeeping, troops have been sent to the borders of
Macedonia to prevent the spread of the Yugoslav inbroglio and a consequent larqerflow of refugees.
The link between peacekeeping and refugees begins after the end
of the Cold lfar in the latter part of the fourth phase of the above development
of the international refugee regi.me when peacekeeping moves out of its classicalphase of interposing blue helmets between two contending parties and peacekeepers
move into the interior of states without the consent of any or all parties to a
conflict and where there may have even been a total disintegration of a unified
state authority. To analyze this connection, the four cases of lrag, Yugoslavia,Somalia and Cambodia can be distinguished by two criteria - whether the states
are multi-national or predominately nation-states, and whether the states have
recognized governments in place which may be in the process of being challengedby a nilitant opposition' or whether there is an absence of a single recogniied
authorit.y over the whole state or area and there is a presence of competinggroups seeking authority through the barrel of a gun.
Iraq and the Kurds
Prior to the termination of the Cold !{ar and the effort to
establish a new international world order following the invasion by and defeat
of Iraq in Kuwait, there was an uprising by the Kurds against the rule of SaddamHussein. The intact Iraqi anny began to guell the rebellion and the Kurds wereforced into the hills as they were turned back from the borders of Turkey but not
the borders of Iran. Prior to the Gulf lfar, the Turks might have been accused bythe international community for closing its borders to the persecuted Kurds.Instead, the United States obtained international sanction to create safe havensfor the Kurds in northern Iraq, thereby creating the conditions for the
development of an autonomous de facto state of Kurdistan under internationalprotection but without international recognition. The o1d consultative assemblybuilding in lrbil for the powerless Kurd assembly has been renovated to house the
Kurdish parliament. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) under the leadership
of Jalal Talabani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) under Maoud Barzani's
leadership have done the unthinkable, merged their peshmerga forces into a single
national army. The Kurds have created a legislative arm and the political
authorities of the nasCent state has been given the monopoly over the use of
coercive force. They even have a foreign policy. In return for cooperating with
the Turks in the crushing of the Kurdish rebels within Turkey, the Turkish armedforces provide logistic support to the nascent Kurdish state all under the
auspices of a humanitarian relief effort to provide a safe haven for the Kurds.
The international community says that no state should refouJ,e a
refugee fleeing persecution. When they are forcefully prevented from seeking
asylum, the international community did not condemn those guilty of refoulement,
but intervened to provide protection for the Turkish border and for the Kurdish
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rninority within the supposedly sacrosanct borders of the nation-state of Iraq,
reinforcing thereby a quasi separatist state.s{ The international community in
the name of sacrosanct borders and the int.egrity of the state of Kuwait orderedfraq to be attacked. In the aftermath of that victory, the international
cornmunity stitl upheld the sacrosanct character of state borders but has been the
major instrument for the de facto division of lraq.
Cambodia
Canbodia is renowned the world over for its infamous killingfields and the estimated one and one haLf million Cambodians killed when the
Khmers Rouges occupied the seat of government. in Phnom Penh. When they weredriven out by the Vietnamese, they retained some control in north-western
Canlcodia and took control of the large canps within Thailand which housed
"refugees' whom the Thais had refused to all-ow to be desigrnated formally as
refugees. with the agreement amonq the four contending parties in Cambodia at the
end of 1991. to end hostilities and attenpt to create a government, The UnitedNations committed three billion dollars and over 20r000 peacekeepers to overseethe successful return of alnost 4001000 refugees and the recreation of a civil
and political order in Canbodia.
For the first time, even the Japanese agrreed to contributepeacekeeping forces. With great difficulty, the ,.Iapanese reversed their postwar
ban against sending ,Japanese troops onto foreign tecitory Peacekeepers were sent
under the auspices of UMAC, the UN Transitional Authority in Carnbodia, to ensure
a peaceful election of a constitutional assenbly on May 23-25, 1993. But thedeclsion was dependent on both sides agreeing to the ,fapanese role.
The Khmers Rouges abrogated the agreement. They refused to disarm
or take part in the election. At the end of .Tanuary of this year, the Phnom Penhgoverrrment in a nilitary preventive action to stop an alJ-eged Khmers Rouges dry
season offensive, attacked the Khmers Rouges at Sien Reap in the north-west, at,
Kompong Thom in central Cambodia, at Kratie in the central eastern area of
Canbodia and in a major thrust against the Khmers Rouges headquarters at Pailin
along the Thai border. The Khmers Rouges struck back. They began their ownprocess of ethnic cleansing by attacking Vietnanese settlements in Cambodia,beginning with the murder of 34 Vietnamese on March 9th in the floating village
on the Tonle Sap river in the area ostensibly controlled by the undisciplined
Bulgarian peacekeepers wtro have been accused of sexually harassing and raping
Carnbodian women and ignoring Cambodian traffic laws. Subseguent attacks followed
and a nr:mber of the 400,000 Vietnamese in Cambodia have fLed as even thegovernment party fails to even speak up for their protection. 4001000 Cambodian
refugees have been returned under UN auspices. Are we witnessing the creation of
4001000 Vietnamese refugees under UN auspices in exchange? The Khners Rouges have
attacked and killed Bulgarian peacekeepers and even ki}led one Japanesepoliceman, in the process and raising another hue and cry 1n ,Iapan about the
Japanese presence in Cambodia. Even Phnorn Penh is not immune from attack as
grenade attacks and firebombs are thrown at cafes in the capital.
have been 
',,.,0",3'll"ri3i3ni"ii::;l:'.il5 ;:rlij,ilTs-"1 Ki[r""#1"'3'3i3:::iprosecutor to try two alleged killers, a Phnom Penh policeman and a Khmers Rouges
soldier, but no actual. trial seens to be in the offing. The UN has sent in
peacekeepers in a land where one of the parties openly disavows electoral
5{cf,Ade1nan,"lIunanitar1arrIntervention:TheCageoftheKurdg,"@
of Befusee_Lal, volut[e {, No. 1, April 1992 and nThe Ethlcs of gumani.tarian Interventlon: The Case
o?-t[e Kutdish'Refugees," Public Affalrs 0uarter]y, "Special Issue on Refugeesri volume 6, Issue 1,January 1992,
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poLitics, has refused to surrender its anns and bLatanlly. att_acks Vietnamesetivilians, UN election and hurnanitarian officials and the U\ peacekeepers
themselves. No monopoly on the control and use of coercive force has b€en
established in Carnbo-ctia, the prereguisite to developing a civil society and a
government selected by and responslble to the people.
What can the UN forces do after the election - withdraw and watch
a civil war break out or increase their numbers to give the newly elected
government a chance, assuming, of course, that the electoral 
-proc_ess. lorlcsidequately enough for a govertrment to be considered as the legitimate
representative of the PeoPIe.
The contradiction is the following. The UN claims to be impart.ial
and neutral between and among competing factions. In fact, it is not partia] at
all. It is committed to a liberal theory of responsible government and ofindividual human rights. At the same tirne, it, is committed to a stable order
based on the sovereignty of states with the state holding a monopoly on the 
-useof coercj.ve power. But thile the UN may insist-that a state have an elected form
of governrnerit responsible to and chosen by the peo.ple, the UN does little to
upnotd the fact and the principle th_at ?ny responsible government must have a
mbnopoly on the use of force. In the hands of an irresponsible government, that
monopoly can be turned against the people thenselves.
UN Authoritv and Somalia
The UN sent troops to police Somalia but they were useless and
had to stay in their barracks until they were rescued_by a much- larger' better
eguipped US force sent not so much to rescue Somalia from anarchy as to rescue
ttie UN from an irnpotent effort at peacekeeping. Since the American forces have
departed, reports emerge that the nilitant anarchy is also returning. Given the
stigma attached to the presence of Anerican forces, there is a reluctance on theparf of the Americans as well as the international corunun_ity to rely on the
-overwhelming power of the US, but without the presence of that overwhelming
power, ttre lUifity to repress those who would resort to arns to resolve theirdifferences seems to diminish over time.
Further, in the anarchy of Somalia, a central authority is needed
to run the economy and insLitute a working judicial system. Tbe Econonist has
called for the UN-to set itself up as "king of tne Somali castle." (March 6-12,p. 18) But this is precisely wtrat the people themselves must do. The UN must not
establish itself as king of the caslle but as a praetorian quard until theinstitutions of the civil society and the political state are reestablished and
strengthened.
Ethnic Cleansi-nq in Bosnia-Herceqovina
How is the international community to navigate between the Scylla
of ethnic nationalism and the Charybdes of sacrosanct sovereign states? How, aspatrick Moynihan recently phrase-d the guestion lPandenoniun:_ E_thnicity. jnInternationil Politics, Otfoid: OUP) can the world be made safe both for ethnic
groups and from ethnic fanaticism? (Cf. aLso Ade1man, "Ethnicity and Refugeesr "in Wbrld Refrlqee Sgrvev, 1992, pp. 6-11.)
Can one really take seriously that the Croats,. Serbs and Muslim
Bosnians could live in peace tbgether successfully in a reorganized federal statein line with the Vanc-e-Owen peace plan? Can the Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina
reallv be expected to surrehder ttre contiguity and enlargement of theiriiiiitorial bise in Bosnia-Hercegovina? How can those territories be recreatedii-JJminantly Muslin cantons when-they have already^been 
_ethnically cleansed and
oooulated bv'Serbs since under the latesL version of the Vance-Onren plan, Muslimto'riei wili not be allowed to return? Though the Security Council voted on
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February 22nd to set up a the first special war crimes tribunal since Neurenberg
does anyone expect any of the war criminals to be tried?
In other words, the peace plan sayr it provides for a return tcthe'statug qu9 ante',but in the form of a federated state, while everyone seensto recogqize it really means the international recognition of the sep-ration ofthe ethnic groups in. 
_a-ccordance with the facts on the ground. Ethnic cleansingat this late date will have been rewarded in the guise of an internationallyinposed peace. Even the earlier efforts of the United States to airdrop relie?
supplies in the beginning of March was debated as a controversial move which
might arouse Serb aggression and stimulate attacks against the lightly armed UNpeacekeeping forces.
So^75,000 peacekeepers qiqht be regulped to ostensibty to keeppeace between ethnic Aroups but, in realitVr to recogrnize the order of victory:the victory of Serbs over both Croats and Muslims and the victory of the Croits
over the MusJims. The alternative to such a hlpocritical peace plan is bornbing
of Serb artilleryr-supply.Ii4es and supplies and perhaps lifting the arms ernbarg6
on the Muslims. Alternatively, UN peacekeepers could be sent- into an unstabie
area to secure safe havens for the refugees when it is difficult enough for the
UN troops to provide safe havens for themselves. The obligations are-difficult
enough to sort out without raising guestions about the contradictory goals andthe guestionable means of achieving a moral obligation of protecting Eivilians
from slaughter and rape.
Conclusion
There are numerous other areas where the UN could be sent to keepthe peace between and anong waring ethnic factions, warlords and tribes - thiconflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, in Myanmar, in South Africa, etc. In
most of those places, as in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Somalia, Kurdistan and Cambodia,there is no real peace to keep. But at least the UN troops nay have inhibited
norg expansionist all-out htars. 1n none of these areas is there a clearly definedpolitical objective within reach or honestly articulated. Each situation is fuIIof contradictions and controversy. The chances of success is slim as BoutrosBoutros Ghali promotes his new Agenda for Peace.
The UN in the gulse of creat,ing safe havens for refuqeesparticipates in the de facto partition of a country, the very presence instigitedin defence of the sacrosanct character of state borders. The UN, in the atternptto create a neutral ground for the creation of a dernocratic regime in Carnbodii,
becones a target for militants $tith both real and moral bullets. The UN brtrich
began its history as the instrument for decolonization, is urged on to become theinstrument of neo-coloni.al authority in Sonalia. And in Bosnia-Hercegovina the
UN, through delay and procrastination, is destined to become the authority wtrich
sanctions ethnic cleansing and guards the reality on the ground as it deplores
these same results rhetorically.
The league of peace is not and cannot be in the business of
stopping each and every war. It must, as Kant said, be in the business of making
an end of aLL wars forever. Two criteria were proffered. The league (or the UN)
cannot operate as king of the castle, assunuing dominion over the power of the
state even if only on an interim basis but must restrict its efforts to the
maintenance of freedom and security. The inhabitants of the state itself have to
remain responsible for reconstructing their civil society and reestablishing thegovernment. Further, each peacekeeping operation should be assessed in tenns of
whether or not it contributes or detracts from the long term goal of terminating
war altogether. The UN can only do this if it sorts out whether it wants to be
a league-of nations protecting ethnic groups and ensuring they have a role intheir own self-determination (there are over 5000 nations on this earth) or a
league of states with sacrosanct borders. Otherwise the UN will meander from one
insoluble quaErrire to another.
96
Sacrosanct borders are not holding up action by the international
community when those borders have been made porous by the indigenous population.
The real guestion is whether Lhe international community is willing to risk thelives of its citizens serving under UN auspices for a cause in which there is no
imnediate or apparent security threat to themselves, no vital economic interests,
no military aggression across a recognized international border of a member ofthe UN.
It will onJ.y do so if there are clear moral guidelines and goalsfor doing so. The UNHCR has moved fro protecting refugees who have fled across
a border to attonpting to protect displaced persons within a border, but it is
not clear about its mandate or the measures it must use to protect minorities
within such states. Until a clear guideline has been established for both self-
determination and for the protection of minorities, and until the UN is willingto assert its full pohrers to monopoLize the use of coercive power until. statesin conflict put their house in order, the UN will continue to be hampered by
contradictory normative conceptions and ineffectual tools on the ground.
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